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DYNKIN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE AND
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
TIZIANO DE ANGELIS, ERIK EKSTRO¨M AND KRISTOFFER GLOVER
Abstract. We study Nash equilibria for a two-player zero-sum optimal
stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our
set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one
player (incomplete information feature), but known to the other one
(asymmetric information feature). We formulate the problem and reduce
it to a fully Markovian setup where the uninformed player optimises
over stopping times and the informed one uses randomised stopping
times in order to hide their informational advantage. Then we provide
a general verification result which allows us to find Nash equilibria by
solving suitable quasi-variational inequalities with some non-standard
constraints. Finally, we study an example with linear payoffs, in which
an explicit solution of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities
can be obtained.
1. Introduction
The primary focus in this paper is to devise methods to establish the
existence of Nash equilibria for two-player Dynkin games with incomplete
and asymmetric information. The process underlying the game is a one-
dimensional linear diffusion X. Both players observe the path of X and
Player 2 (the informed player) knows exactly the drift and diffusion co-
efficient of the process. Player 1 (the uninformed player) has incomplete
information in the sense that she cannot observe directly the drift coeffi-
cient of X but has a prior distribution for it and can improve upon her
initial estimate by sequential observation of the process. For simplicity and
clarity of exposition we consider the case in which the drift can be either of
two continuous functions of the state process, denoted µ0( · ) and µ1( · ).
Crucially, the one-sided lack of information introduces an asymmetry in
the game because, contrarily to the informed player, the uninformed one
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cannot compute the true expected payoff of the game (for each given stop-
ping rule).
In line with the literature on differential games with asymmetric informa-
tion, it turns out that the informed player must use randomised stopping
strategies in order to maximise the benefits of their informational advan-
tage. The effect of randomisation is indeed to ‘hide’ the true drift from the
uninformed player in an attempt to mislead her into acting in a way that
benefits the informed player. On the contrary, the uninformed player can-
not improve her performance by using randomisation (see Remark 2.6) and
therefore will simply rely on stopping times for the filtration generated by
X.
The key contributions of the paper are: (i) we give an explicit Markov-
ian formulation of the problem and show its equivalence with a three-player
nonzero-sum game of singular control and optimal stopping (Section 3); the
resulting nonzero-sum game features a peculiar structure of the interaction
among the players (Remark 3.6); moreover, the game is non-standard in
the sense that the singular controls (played by Player 2) are not observable
by Player 1; (ii) building on the previous item we formulate a verification
theorem that allows us to construct Nash equilibria for the original game
with incomplete and asymmetric information (Section 5); the verification
result (Theorem 5.1) is formulated in terms of a quasi-variational inequal-
ity with a set of non-standard constraints; it appears that such constraints
are a special feature of the asymmetric information setting; (iii) using the
quasi-variational inequality approach we solve explicitly (up to numerical
root-finding) a version of our game with linear payoffs (Section 6); the ex-
ample illustrates how ‘reflected adjusted likelihood ratios’ are used to hide
information in an optimal way.
To the best of our knowledge all the three items above are new in the liter-
ature. In particular, we would like to emphasise that the majority of papers
on zero-sum games with asymmetric information focus on the existence of
a value for the game, whereas the construction of Nash equilibria is mostly
overlooked (we will elaborate more on this point in the literature review
below). In this sense, we depart from the existing literature and present a
feasible method for the characterisation of Nash equilibria. Moreover, the
value of the game is normally obtained when both players are allowed to
use randomised strategies; here instead we only allow pure strategies for
the uninformed player. Finally, the approach developed in Section 3 is not
specific to our setting and it can be used more broadly to link zero-sum
Dynkin games with asymmetric information to n-player nonzero-sum games
of singular control and stopping.
1.1. Motivations and literature review. Dynkin games were originally
introduced in [15] as a game variant of optimal stopping problems. Their
popularity in the last two decades is largely due to their applications to
finance. Indeed many financial contracts are equipped with exit strategies
DYNKIN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 3
that allow one or several parties to abandon their obligations early but at an
additional cost. These ‘exit options’ embedded in the contracts are known
in the mathematical finance literature as game options.
In 2000 Kifer [25] showed that the arbitrage-free price of a game option
can be found by solving a related Dynkin game. In the full information case,
general conditions under which a Nash equilibrium for the game exists were
derived in [28] (in a martingale setting) and in [17] (in a Markovian set-up).
Acknowledging the importance of information in applications of such
games, more recent literature has considered games with asymmetric in-
formation structures. For example, asymmetric information about the time
horizon of the game was considered in [27], who concluded that, in the set-
ting of that paper, the more you know, the longer you wait. Moreover, Gru¨n
[23] studied the effect of asymmetric information about the payoff structure
of the game; motivated by earlier studies (see [6] and [7]) of differential
games with asymmetric information as well as by an explicit example, Gru¨n
allowed the informed player to use randomised stopping strategies to manip-
ulate the beliefs of the uninformed player, and she characterised the value
of the game as the unique viscosity solution of a related variational inequal-
ity. Note that the concept of ‘value’ here (and in the existing literature on
zero-sum games with asymmetric information) coincides with the expected
payoff in equilibrium of the uninformed player in our paper (see Remark 3.4
for further details). A more general situation was considered in [22], in which
each player has access to stopping times with respect to different filtrations.
In such a scenario each player must learn about the state of the world from
the actions (or inaction) of the other player. Again, a variational character-
isation of the value of the game is obtained in a similar form to [23]. The
article [23] does not consider the question of existence for Nash equilibria
but constructs optimal randomised stopping times for the informed player.
Nash equilibria, instead, are addressed in [22] for non-diffusive dynamics.
It is important to notice that the setting in [23] is different from ours
because in that paper the observable dynamics are fully known. Then, in
contrast to our setting, in [23] there is no learning from the observation
of the process. It is also worth noticing that the variational problem in
[23] (and the one in [22]) looks very different from ours: Gru¨n obtains a
single variational inequality (as opposed to our coupled variational problem
in Theorem 5.1) which involves three nested obstacle problems of the type
‘max-max-min’. Existence of smooth solutions to such variational problems
remains an open question and the explicit motivating example of [23] does
not include a random dynamic. It does not seem trivial to show a clear
connection between our variational problem and that in [23]. However, our
method allows to solve an example with diffusive dynamics by proving that
the associated quasi-variational inequality has a unique classical solution
(see Section 6).
Another formulation of asymmetric information within a Dynkin game
was treated in [19], who provided conditions for the existence of a Nash
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equilibrium in stopping times for a setting where learning for the unin-
formed player is not considered. In [19] both players use stopping times,
although those of the informed player are taken with respect to a larger
filtration which includes extra information on the structure of the game.
Randomisation is not needed in their setting because the informed player
does not need to hide the information. It is indeed stated in Section 3.1,
p. 288, of [19] that the uninformed player ‘does not care about’ or ‘is not
allowed to use’ the additional information. This stands in sharp contrast
with our setting (as well as that of [23, 22], among others).
Finally, in [16] a Dynkin game in which both players had differing beliefs
about the drift of the underlying process was studied. However, in that arti-
cle, information is fully symmetric and complete, with both players agreeing
to disagree.
In comparison to [16] and [19], where the set-up involves no learning, and
[23] and [22], where the players learn only from the actions of the opponent,
our players are faced with a more complex, two-source, learning situation.
In particular, the uninformed player learns about the drift of the underlying
process by continuous observations of the process itself and from the actions
of the informed player.
Since learning is a key ingredient in our problem formulation, we naturally
draw on the literature on stochastic filtering. Early contributions in the
area include treatments of statistical problems in sequential analysis, see
for example [3], [8] and [35]. A general treatment of stochastic filtering
can be found in [29], and some important early work on the application of
such techniques to investment problems with incomplete information can
be found in [30] and [31]. More recent contributions along the financial
lines include [2], [4], [10], [14], [33] and [39] (and the references therein). For
incomplete information in the context of optimal stopping, an early reference
is [13] which treats the effect of incomplete information on American-style
option valuation; see also [21] and [38]. An optimal liquidation problem with
unknown drift was studied in [18], and with an unknown jump intensity
in [32]. A Dynkin game with symmetric and incomplete information was
studied in [12], in which the existence of a Nash equilibrium was established.
Finally, a related paper from the economics literature is [9], which considers
the problem of a privately informed seller attempting to trade in a market of
less informed buyers, and where information about the asset’s type (‘good’
or ‘bad’) is gradually revealed to them. In this setting, the market places
offers based on this information and on the observation of the offers rejected
by the seller so far. In this sense the learning process occurs from two sources
as in our paper. However, the key difference with the current paper is that
the buyers (i.e., the market) are non-strategic. Hence the mathematical
formulation of the problem in [9] may be interpreted as a one-dimensional
singular control problem with discretionary stopping for the seller, where the
reaction of the market to new information is fully prescribed by a function
of the underlying process.
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1.2. Comments on the example with linear payoff and outline of
the paper. As mentioned above we obtain an explicit solution of the game
(in Section 6) in a particular case with linear payoffs. This includes explicit
strategies for both players as well as computable equilibrium payoffs.
In this example the underlying process is a geometric Brownian motion
with drift µ. Then the uninformed player (Player 1) has a two-point prior
distribution for µ (i.e., µ ∈ {µ0, µ1}, with µ0 < 0 < µ1) whose support
contains the true drift. Player 1 knows standard filtering theory and updates
her belief about µ by computing, at each time t > 0, the likelihood ratio Φt.
This represents the ratio between the (conditional) probability that the true
drift is µ1 and the probability that it is µ0, given the observation of (Xs)0≤s≤t
(see Section 3). However, Player 1 also observes the (lack of) actions of
Player 2 (informed) and she should modify her estimate of Φt accordingly.
This happens particularly if the informed player does not stop when the
process X is in some specific regions of the state space (loosely speaking, if
Player 2 does not stop at points where she would be supposed to stop in a
game with full information with µ = µ1, then Player 1 may be more inclined
to believe that µ = µ0). Following this rationale, in equilibrium, Player 1 will
produce an adjusted likelihood ratio Φ∗ (see (33)), which depends on both
the observation of the process and the lack of actions from the opponent.
As it turns out in our analysis, in equilibrium the informed player stops
according to a generalised intensity specified in such a way that the ad-
justed likelihood ratio process is reflecting at an upper boundary, and the
uninformed player stops when this process falls below a certain threshold.
To prove the existence of such a Nash equilibrium we solve explicitly the
associated quasi-variational inequalities and then invoke our verification re-
sult (Theorem 5.1). Our verification result indicates that reflection of the
adjusted likelihood ratio plays a vital role also in the general case; however,
reflection is then along curved boundaries that need to be determined as
part of the solution of the variational inequalities. It is hoped that our anal-
ysis in the specific example with linear payoffs can be used to inform future
work on more general optimal stopping games and on the solvability of the
quasi-variational inequality that we derive in Section 5.
We conclude with an outline of the material in the paper. In Section 2 we
formulate the general Dynkin game and introduce the class of randomised
stopping times used by the informed player. The learning dynamics are
derived and the game is reformulated as an equivalent game of stopping and
singular control in Section 3. In Section 4 we explain how the informed
player manipulates the beliefs of the uninformed one. A verification result
based on quasi-variational inequalities is provided in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 investigates the example with linear payoffs in detail, and Section 7
illustrates the Nash equilibrium in this example numerically with a base-
case set of parameters providing intuition for the optimal strategies used in
equilibrium.
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2. Setting
Assume that on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) we have two random vari-
ables θ and U together with a standard Wiener process W mutually inde-
pendent of each other, and such that P(θ = 1) = π and P(θ = 0) = 1 − π
where π ∈ (0, 1) and U is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. We consider an
optimal stopping game written on an underlying process X with dynamics
dXt = ((1− θ)µ0(Xt) + θµ1(Xt)) dt+ σ(Xt) dWt(1)
on a (possibly unbounded) interval I. Here µ0(·), µ1(·) and σ(·) > 0 are
given continuous functions such that the state space of X is I on both events
{θ = 0} and {θ = 1}. Then (1) admits a weak solution which is also unique
in law, and to avoid further technicalities we assume that the boundary
points of I are unattainable.
The game is specified by Player 1 choosing a (random) time τ and Player 2
choosing a (random) time γ, and at τ ∧ γ, Player 1 receives the amount
R(τ, γ) := f(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g(Xγ)1{τ≥γ}
from Player 2. Here the payoff functions f and g are two given functions
satisfying g ≥ f ≥ 0. The objective of Player 1 (2) is to choose τ (γ)
from a set of admissible stopping strategies to maximize (minimize) the
expected value of R(τ, γ). The notion of admissible stopping strategies will
be specified below. To avoid further technical complications, we will assume
continuity of the payoff functions.
Assumption 2.1. The payoff functions f and g are continuous on I.
Both players observe the process X, however we assume that Player 1
is partially informed whereas Player 2 is fully informed: initially, the only
available information for Player 1 is the distribution of θ given above, while
Player 2 knows the true value of θ already at the start of the game (the
opposite case can be treated similarly). This asymmetry is modeled by
letting the information available to Player 1 be given by the augmentation
with P-null sets of the filtration
FXt := σ(Xs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t),
whereas the information available to Player 2 is given by the augmentation
of the filtration
FX,θt := σ(θ,Xs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
We stress that the set-up of the game is known to both players. In par-
ticular, the initial probability π and the functions µ0, µ1 and σ are known
to both players, Player 1 is aware that Player 2 knows the true value of
the drift, and Player 2 knows the distribution of θ from the perspective of
Player 1.
When considering games with asymmetric information, hiding of infor-
mation plays a crucial role. This is modeled mathematically by allowing
stopping strategies to be randomised stopping times. In fact, below we allow
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the informed player (Player 2) to use randomised stopping times, whereas
the uninformed one (Player 1) uses strategies that are stopping times.
The following notations will be needed in the rest of the paper. We let
FX = (FX)t≥0 and F
X,θ = (FX,θt )t≥0 and denote
T := {τ : τ is a P-a.s. finite FX -stopping time}
T := {τ : τ is an FX -stopping time}
A := {Γ: (Γt)t≥0 is F
X -adapted and a.s. right-continuous,
non-decreasing, with Γ0− = 0 and Γ∞ ≤ 1}
Aθ := {Γ: (Γt)t≥0− is F
X,θ-adapted and a.s. right-continuous,
non-decreasing, with Γ0− = 0 and Γ∞ ≤ 1}.
In the definitions above we use Γ0− = 0 to indicate that Γ0 > 0 can only be
achieved by a jump of the process at time zero.
Clearly, A ⊆ Aθ; also note that Γ ∈ Aθ if and only if Γ = Γ01{θ=0} +
Γ11{θ=1} for some Γ
0,Γ1 ∈ A.
To define randomised stopping times (see, e.g., [37]), recall that U is
a random variable which is independent of W and θ and Uniformly(0,1)-
distributed.
Definition 2.2 (Randomised stopping times).
(A) An FX -randomised stopping time is a random variable γ given by
(2) γ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Γt > U}, for some Γ ∈ A.
We denote the set of FX-randomised stopping times by TR.
(B) An FX,θ-randomised stopping time is a random variable γθ given by
(3) γθ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Γt > U}, for some Γ ∈ A
θ.
We denote the set of FX,θ-randomised stopping times by T θR.
We then have
T ⊆ T ⊆ TR ⊆ T
θ
R .
Indeed, the first inclusion is clear by definition and the third inclusion is
immediate from A ⊆ Aθ; moreover, if τ ∈ T , then the construction (2) with
Γt =
{
0 t < τ
1 t ≥ τ
gives a randomised stopping time that coincides with τ , which proves the
middle inclusion.
Furthermore, any γθ ∈ T
θ
R can be decomposed as
γθ = γ01{θ=0} + γ11{θ=1}
for some (γ0, γ1) ∈ TR × TR. We say that γ ∈ TR is generated by Γ ∈ A if
γ is defined as in (2). Similarly, γθ ∈ T
θ
R is generated by Γ ∈ A
θ if γθ is
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defined as in (3). For future reference, given a γ ∈ TR generated by Γ ∈ A,
we also introduce FX -stopping times (i.e., members of T )
γ(z) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Γt > z}, for all z ∈ [0, 1].(4)
Definition 2.3. A randomised stopping pair is a pair (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R . A
couple (τ,Γ) ∈ T × Aθ or a triple (τ,Γ0,Γ1) ∈ T × A × A are equivalent
characterisations of a randomised stopping pair.
With a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes write γθ = Γ = (Γ
0,Γ1),
where (Γ0,Γ1) is the decomposition of Γ that generates γθ. Given a ran-
domised stopping pair (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R , the expected payoff of the game
from the point of view of the uninformed player is
J (τ, γθ) = J (τ,Γ
0,Γ1) := E [R(τ, γθ)] .(5)
(See Remark 3.4 for further details around this interpretation of J .) The
lower value v and the upper value v of the game (for Player 1) are defined
by
v := sup
τ∈T
inf
γθ∈T
θ
R
J (τ, γθ) ≤ inf
γθ∈T
θ
R
sup
τ∈T
J (τ, γθ) =: v,(6)
and we say that a value v exists if v = v.
Definition 2.4. A randomised stopping pair (τ∗, γ∗θ ) ∈ T × T
θ
R is a Nash
equilibrium if
E [R(τ, γ∗θ )] ≤ E [R(τ
∗, γ∗θ )] ≤ E [R(τ
∗, γθ)]
for all other pairs (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R .
It is immediate to check that the existence of a Nash equilibrium implies
the existence of a value. Although the definition above only makes use of the
expected payoff of the uninformed player, it will be shown in Proposition 3.5
that this is the right concept of Nash equilibrium in our context.
Remark 2.5. Note that we restrict our attention to stopping times in T , i.e.
stopping times that are finite P-a.s. This has the advantage that the notation
and calculations become easier. Moreover, a Nash equilibrium (τ∗, γ∗θ ) ∈
T × T θR (as in Definition 2.4) would also be a Nash equilibrium for the
corresponding game with strategies in T × T θR and with expected payoff
J ′(τ, γθ) := E[R(τ, γθ)1{τ∧γθ<∞}].
Remark 2.6. As mentioned above, there is no benefit for Player 1 in choos-
ing a randomised stopping time if the game has a value (compare, e.g., [26]).
Indeed, first note that
sup
τ∈T
J ′(τ, γθ) = sup
τ∈T
J (τ, γθ)
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for any γθ ∈ T
θ
R by Fatou’s lemma. Consequently, for any γθ ∈ T
θ
R and
γ ∈ TR, recalling (4), we have
J ′(γ, γθ) =
∫ 1
0
J ′(γ(z), γθ)dz ≤ sup
z∈[0,1]
J ′(γ(z), γθ)
≤ sup
τ∈T
J ′(τ, γθ) = sup
τ∈T
J (τ, γθ).
The inequality above implies
v ≤ sup
γ∈TR
inf
γθ∈T
θ
R
J ′(γ, γθ) ≤ inf
γθ∈T
θ
R
sup
γ∈TR
J ′(γ, γθ) ≤ v,
which validates our claim, provided that v = v.
Remark 2.7. For bounded payoff functions f and g, the set-up and results of
the present article straightforwardly extend to the opposite case when instead
Player 1 knows the drift and Player 2 only has partial information. However,
additional care is needed for unbounded payoffs; in particular, one needs to
be careful with the specification of the payoff at time infinity, as well as in
specifying appropriate transversality conditions as in Theorem 5.1 below.
3. An equivalent game of stopping and singular control
Here we formulate the game in a Markovian setting and show that it
is equivalent to a 3-player nonzero-sum game of singular control and stop-
ping. We begin by rewriting the expected cost functional in a more explicit
form, which takes into account Player 1’s learning of the true drift through
observations of the process X.
For t ≥ 0 denote by
(7) Πt := P(θ = 1|F
X
t )
the conditional expectation of the larger drift given observations of the un-
derlying process X. By standard filtering theory (see [29, Chapter 9]) we
have
dXt = (µ0(Xt)(1 −Πt) + µ1(Xt)Πt) dt+ σ(Xt) dBt, X0 = x
and
(8) dΠt = ω(Xt)Πt(1−Πt) dBt, Π0 = π.
Here the innovation process
Bt :=
∫ t
0
1
σ(Xs)
dXs −
∫ t
0
µ0(Xs) + (µ1(Xs)− µ0(Xs))Πs
σ(Xs)
ds
is a (P,FX)-Brownian motion and ω(·) := (µ1(·)− µ0(·))/σ(·) is referred to
as the signal-to-noise ratio.
Now the process (Xt,Πt)t≥0 is Markovian and adapted to F
X . In what
follows, for (x, π) ∈ I × (0, 1), we will denote
Px,pi( · ) := P( · |X0 = x,Π0 = π) and Ex,pi[ · ] := E[ · |X0 = x,Π0 = π].
10 TIZIANO DE ANGELIS, ERIK EKSTRO¨M AND KRISTOFFER GLOVER
Also, in (5) we use Jx,pi(τ, γθ) to emphasise the dependence of the expected
game payoff on the initial data.
In preparation for the reduction of our game to one of control and stop-
ping, we introduce integrals of the form∫ τ
0
Yt− dΓt := Y0Γ0 +
∫
(0,τ ]
Yt− dΓt,
for Γ ∈ A and Y a right-continuous, non-negative process adapted to FX .
Integrals of this type are to be interpreted in the Stieltjes sense, and it is
important to remark that, in this context, both the (possible) initial and
terminal jumps of the process Γ are accounted for. Moreover, recalling (4)
and using [34, Prop. 4.9, Ch. 0], we have∫ 1
0
g(Xγ(z))1{γ(z)≤τ}dz =
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓt(9)
for τ ∈ T .
Proposition 3.1. For (x, π) ∈ I × (0, 1) and any (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R we have
Jx,pi(τ, γθ) =Ex,pi
[
(1−Πτ )(1 − Γ
0
τ )f(Xτ ) + (1−Πτ )
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t
]
(10)
+ Ex,pi
[
Πτ (1− Γ
1
τ )f(Xτ ) + Πτ
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
1
t
]
,
where (Γ0,Γ1) ∈ A×A is the couple that generates γθ.
Proof. By definition of the game’s payoff and by the definition of T θR we have
Jx,pi (τ, γθ) = Ex,pi
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<γθ} + g(Xγθ )1{γθ≤τ}
]
= Ex,pi
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<γ0}∩{θ=0} + g(Xγ0)1{γ0≤τ}∩{θ=0}
]
(11)
+Ex,pi
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<γ1}∩{θ=1} + g(Xγ1)1{γ1≤τ}∩{θ=1}
]
.
With the aim of using the tower property in the expression above, we claim
that
Ex,pi
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<γ0}∩{θ=0}
∣∣FXτ ] = (1−Πτ )f(Xτ )(1 − Γ0τ )(12)
Ex,pi
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<γ1}∩{θ=1}
∣∣FXτ ] = Πτf(Xτ )(1− Γ1τ )(13)
Ex,pi
[
g(Xγ0)1{γ0≤τ}∩{θ=0}
∣∣FXτ ] = (1−Πτ )∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t(14)
Ex,pi
[
g(Xγ1)1{γ1≤τ}∩{θ=1}
∣∣FXτ ] = Πτ ∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
1
t .(15)
Taking conditional expectation inside (11) and using the above expressions
we obtain (10).
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It therefore only remains to prove the formulae above. Let us start by
noticing that
(16) {Γ0τ < U} ⊆ {τ < γ0} ⊆ {Γ
0
τ ≤ U}.
Since Xτ is F
X
τ -measurable, using simple properties of conditional expecta-
tion and (7) we have
Ex,pi
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<γ0}∩{θ=0}
∣∣FXτ ] = f(Xτ )Px,pi (τ < γ0∣∣FXτ , θ = 0) (1−Πτ ).
Then, by definition of γ0, using that U is independent of θ, Γ
0
τ is F
X
τ -
measurable and (16), we also obtain
Px,pi
(
τ < γ0
∣∣FXτ , θ = 0) = Px,pi (Γ0τ ≤ U ∣∣FXτ , θ = 0) = (1− Γ0τ ).
Combining the last two expressions leads to (12). Clearly (13) follows by
the same argument.
For (14) we follow a similar approach and we also recall γ(u) as in (4)
and (9). Then we have
Ex,pi
[
g(Xγ0)1{γ0≤τ}∩{θ=0}
∣∣FXτ ]
=Ex,pi
[
g(Xγ0)1{γ0≤τ}
∣∣FXτ , θ = 0] (1−Πτ )(17)
=Ex,pi
[∫ 1
0
g(Xγ0(z))1{γ0(z)≤τ}dz
∣∣FXτ , θ = 0] (1−Πτ )
=(1−Πτ )
∫ 1
0
g(Xγ0(z))1{γ0(z)≤τ}dz
=(1−Πτ )
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t ,
where in the penultimate equality we used that g(Xγ0(z))1{γ0(z)≤τ} is F
X
τ -
measurable for all z ≥ 0, and the last equality is due to (9).
The proof of (15) is analogous. 
It will be convenient in what follows to also use the likelihood ratio process
Φt := Πt/(1 − Πt), whose dynamics under P are derived from (8) and Itoˆ’s
formula as
dΦt
Φt
= ω(Xt) (dBt +Πt ω(Xt)dt) , Φ0 = ϕ,(18)
where ϕ = π/(1−π). The dynamics of the two-dimensional diffusion (X,Φ)
are somewhat involved under P, and we prefer instead to use the measures
P
0 and P1 specified by
P
i(A) := P(A | θ = i)
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for A ∈ FX∞. It is well-known (see [29, Chapter 9]) that
dP0
dP
∣∣∣
FX
t
=
1−Πt
1− π
=
1 + ϕ
1 + Φt
(19)
= exp
(
−12
∫ t
0
ω2(Xs)Π
2
sds−
∫ t
0
ω(Xs)ΠsdBs
)
,
dP1
dP
∣∣∣
FX
t
=
Πt
π
=exp
(
−12
∫ t
0
ω2(Xs)(1−Πs)
2ds(20)
+
∫ t
0
ω(Xs)(1 −Πs)dBs
)
,
and that X and Φ satisfy
(21)
 dXt = µi(Xt) dt+ σ(Xt) dW
i
t
dΦt = ω(Xt)Φt dW
0
t
= ω2(Xt)Φtdt+ ω(Xt)Φt dW
1
t ,
where
W it := −
∫ t
0
ω(Xs)(i−Πs) ds +Bt
is a Pi-Brownian motion. Note that the system (21) is semi-decoupled in
the sense that the dynamics of X do not depend on Φ.
We now rewrite our problem under the measure P0. In what follows we
set Ei[ · ] for the expectation under the measure Pi, with i = 0, 1.
Corollary 3.2 (The expected payoff for the uninformed player). For
(x, π) ∈ I × (0, 1) and any (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R we have
Jx,pi(τ, γθ) =
1
1 + ϕ
(
E
0
x,pi
[
(1− Γ0τ )f(Xτ ) +
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t
]
(22)
+ E0x,pi
[
(1− Γ1τ )Φτf(Xτ ) +
∫ τ
0
Φtg(Xt)dΓ
1
t
])
,
where ϕ = π/(1 − π).
Proof. We start by looking at the first term on the right-hand side of (10).
For any τ ∈ T , the P-martingale property of Πt and (19) give
E
[
(1−Πτ )(1 − Γ
0
τ )f(Xτ )1{τ≤t}
]
= E
[
E
[
1−Πt|F
X
t∧τ
]
(1− Γ0τ )f(Xτ )1{τ≤t}
]
= E
[
(1−Πt)(1− Γ
0
τ )f(Xτ )1{τ≤t}
]
= (1− π)E0
[
(1− Γ0τ )f(Xτ )1{τ≤t}
]
.
Since dP
0
dP
∣∣∣
FX
t
is bounded (see (19)), P(τ < ∞) = 1 implies that P0(τ <
∞) = 1. Consequently, letting t→∞ yields
E
[
(1−Πτ )(1− Γ
0
τ )f(Xτ )
]
= (1− π)E0
[
(1− Γ0τ )f(Xτ )
]
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by monotone convergence. By the same argument we also obtain
E
[
(1−Πτ )
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t
]
= (1− π)E0
[∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t
]
For the remaining terms in (10) we notice that
E
[
Πτ (1− Γ
1
τ )f(Xτ )
]
= E
[
(1−Πτ )(1 − Γ
1
τ )Φτf(Xτ )
]
= (1− π)E0
[
(1− Γ1τ )Φτf(Xτ )
]
and
E
[
Πτ
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
1
t
]
= (1− π)E0
[∫ τ
0
Φtg(Xt)dΓ
1
t
]
.
Combining the above expressions we obtain (22) upon noticing that 1−π =
(1 + ϕ)−1. 
The next corollary follows in a similar way using (19) and (20) in the first
and second term on the right-hand side of (10), respectively.
Corollary 3.3 (The expected cost for the informed player). For
(x, π) ∈ I × (0, 1) and any (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R we have
Jx,pi(τ, γθ) = (1− π)J
0
x,pi(τ,Γ
0) + πJ 1x,pi(τ,Γ
1),(23)
where
J 0x,pi(τ,Γ
0) := E0x,pi
[
(1− Γ0τ )f(Xτ ) +
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
0
t
]
(24)
and
J 1x,pi(τ,Γ
1) := E1x,pi
[
(1− Γ1τ )f(Xτ ) +
∫ τ
0
g(Xt)dΓ
1
t
]
.(25)
Remark 3.4. The expression in (23) offers a nice interpretation of the
functional Jx,pi. Imagine that before the game starts (i.e., at time t = 0−),
neither of the players knows θ. However, they both know that as soon as
the game starts (i.e., at time t = 0) Player 2 will learn the true value of θ.
Then, we can think of Jx,pi as the expected payoff for both players at time
t = 0− (given the randomised stopping pair (τ, γθ)). As one would expect in
this context, the payoff at time t = 0− is the average according to the prior
distribution of θ of the payoffs in the two possible scenarios.
As soon as the game starts at time t = 0, the payoff of the informed
player ‘collapses’ into either J 0x,pi or J
1
x,pi because she learns the true value
of θ. On the contrary, the expected payoff of Player 1 remains Jx,pi, which
also clarifies our terminology for eqs. (5)–(6).
It is worth noting that many papers in the literature on asymmetric games
(see, e.g., [6, 7, 23, 22]) only use the payoff Jx,pi for their analysis. The
‘value’ of the game in those papers corresponds in our setting to the expected
equilibrium payoff for the uninformed player.
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We now come to the final formulation of the game’s expected payoff,
which is also the one that we find most convenient for our solution method.
For (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R and ϕ = π/(1 − π), let us denote
Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γθ) := (1 + ϕ)Jx,pi(τ, γθ),(26)
and notice that (23) now gives
Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γθ) = J
0
x,ϕ(τ,Γ
0) + ϕJ 1x,ϕ(τ,Γ
1).(27)
Let a stopping time τ be given. It follows from Corollary 3.3 that a strat-
egy Γ = (Γ0,Γ1) of the informed player minimizes Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γθ) if and only if
Γ0 and Γ1 minimize J 0x,ϕ(τ,Γ
0) and J 1x,ϕ(τ,Γ
1), respectively. Consequently,
we have the following characterisation of a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5. Let (x, ϕ) ∈ I×R+ be given. A randomised stopping pair
(τ∗, γ∗θ ) ∈ T × T
θ
R is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, letting (Γ
∗,0,Γ∗,1) ∈
A×A be the couple that generates γ∗θ , we have
(28) J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,0) ≤ J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ0),
(29) J 1x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,1) ≤ J 1x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ1)
and
(30) Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γ
∗
θ ) ≤ Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ )
for all randomised stopping pairs (τ,Γ) ∈ T × Aθ.
We refer to Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ ), J
0
x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,0) and J 1x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,1) as the corre-
sponding equilibrium payoffs.
Remark 3.6. We observe that Proposition 3.5 gives an interpretation of the
game as a 3-player nonzero-sum game between a stopper and two controllers.
Notice that the stopper plays simultaneously against both controllers, whereas
each controller only plays against the stopper. This is in parallel with clas-
sical results on games with incomplete information, see [24].
We also remark that, in contrast with more usual formulations of controller-
stopper games, the processes Γ0 and Γ1 are not to be considered observables
for the stopper and are not part of the state process. Nevertheless, the un-
informed player may of course calculate an equilibrium strategy (Γ∗,0,Γ∗,1)
(should one exist) of the other player.
It is intuitively clear that the informed player (Player 2) should never stop
in a case where the drift is favourable for her. We end this section with a
result along these lines that is useful for constructing a Nash equilibrium in
certain cases; see Section 6 below for an application in a particular example.
Proposition 3.7. Fix (x, ϕ) ∈ R+ × R+ and assume that (τ
∗,Γ∗,0,Γ∗,1) ∈
T × T θR is a Nash equilibrium such that
(31) J 0(τ, 0) ≤ J 0(τ,Γ∗,0)
for all τ ∈ T . Then (τ∗, 0,Γ∗,1) is a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. First note that (29) holds since (τ∗,Γ∗,0,Γ∗,1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, for any Γ0 ∈ TR,
(32) J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗, 0) ≤ J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,0) ≤ J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ0),
where the first inequality comes from (31) and the second from (28). Thus
(28) holds for the candidate equilibrium (τ∗, 0,Γ∗,1).
It remains to show that (30) holds for the candidate equilibrium. To do
that, note first that inserting Γ0 = 0 in (32) yields
J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗, 0) = J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,0).
Consequently,
Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, 0,Γ∗,1) = Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,0,Γ∗,1),
so
Ĵx,ϕ(τ, 0,Γ
∗,1) ≤ Ĵx,ϕ(τ,Γ
∗,0,Γ∗,1)
≤ Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗,Γ∗,0,Γ∗,1) = Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, 0,Γ∗,1)
for τ ∈ T , where the first inequality follows from (31) and the second one
from (τ∗,Γ∗,0,Γ∗,1) being a Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
4. Adjusted beliefs and Nash equilibria
Since we assume fully rational players, if an equilibrium exists both players
are able to compute it in the sense that they both know the stopping time
τ∗ and the increasing processes Γ∗,0 and Γ∗,1 that are used to generate
γ∗θ . Assume that the players agree on an equilibrium (τ
∗, γ∗θ ). Given the
generating processes Γ∗,0 and Γ∗,1, the uninformed player calculates what
may be refered to as the adjusted posterior probability
Π∗t := P(θ = 1
∣∣FXt , γ∗θ > t), t ≥ 0.(33)
Using properties of conditional expectations we can write
Π∗t =
P(θ = 1, γ∗θ > t
∣∣FXt )
P(γ∗θ > t
∣∣FXt )(34)
=
P(γ∗1 > t
∣∣FXt , θ = 1)P(θ = 1∣∣FXt )
P(γ∗θ > t
∣∣FXt )
=
(1− Γ∗,1t )Πt
P(γ∗θ > t
∣∣FXt ) ,
where the last equality is obtained using the same arguments as those used
in the proof of Proposition 3.1. Similarly, for the denominator we have
P(γ∗θ > t
∣∣FXt ) = P(γ∗0 > t∣∣FXt , θ = 0)P(θ = 0∣∣FXt )(35)
+ P(γ∗1 > t
∣∣FXt , θ = 1)P(θ = 1∣∣FXt )
= (1− Γ∗,0t )(1−Πt) + (1− Γ
∗,1
t )Πt.
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Combining (34)–(35) gives
Π∗t =
(1− Γ∗,1t )Φt
1− Γ∗,0t + (1− Γ
∗,1
t )Φt
,(36)
and then it becomes straightforward to see that the adjusted posterior prob-
ability satisfies
Φ∗t :=
Π∗t
1−Π∗t
= Φt
1− Γ∗,1t
1− Γ∗,0t
, t ≥ 0.(37)
Thus Φ∗t is the likelihood ratio of the adjusted posterior probability.
Before proceeding we would like to emphasize a subtle point whose under-
standing is key to the proof of Theorem 5.1 below. When constructing Nash
equilibria we will need to verify conditions (28) and (29); so the question
arises as to what τ∗ should depend on. To this end we recall that processes
Γ ∈ Aθ are not observable by Player 1 (Remark 3.6) because the two play-
ers do not communicate (they only see their opponent stop at some point).
Therefore, if Player 2 plays a non-equilibrium pair (Γ0,Γ1) the stopping
time τ∗ is not affected by this choice. In fact, since both players are equally
clever and know the equilibrium pairs (τ∗,Γ∗), Player 1’s choice of τ∗ should
depend only on the (equilibrium) adjusted belief process associated with Γ∗.
That is, one should expect that τ∗ is a stopping time for the paths of the
process (X,Φ∗). This fact will be key in the second step of the proof of
Theorem 5.1.
5. A verification result
In this section we provide a verification result (Theorem 5.1) which ad-
dresses the question of existence of a Nash equilibrium from the point of view
of PDE theory. In particular we show that a triple of functions (u, u0, u1)
with u := u0 + ϕu1 that solves an appropriate quasi-variational inequal-
ity provides the equilibrium payoffs for the game as in (28), (29) and (30).
This is done by identifying a Nash equilibrium from the candidate func-
tions (u, u0, u1). The formulation in terms of a quasi-variational inequality
bridges the probabilistic formulation of our problem to PDE theory and will
be used in the next section to construct a full solution to a specific example
with linear payoffs.
Denote by W 2,∞loc (I × (0,+∞)) the usual Sobolev space of functions in
L∞loc whose first and second derivatives are also functions in L
∞
loc (recall also
that letting C1K be the space of C
1 functions on a compact K, by Sobolev
embeddingW 2,∞loc ⊂ C
1
K for any compactK, [1, Thm. 4.12]). In what follows,
for i = 0, 1, denote by Li the second order differential operator associated
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with the dynamics of (X,Φ) under the measure Pi, that is
L0 :=12
(
ω2(x)ϕ2∂ϕϕ + σ
2(x)∂xx + 2(σω)(x)ϕ∂xϕ
)
+ µ0(x)∂x ,(38)
L1 :=12
(
ω2(x)ϕ2∂ϕϕ + σ
2(x)∂xx + 2(σω)(x)ϕ∂xϕ
)
(39)
+ µ1(x)∂x + ω
2(x)ϕ∂ϕ .
In the next theorem we will use the following localising sequences of stop-
ping times: for a C1 function h, let
I(h)t :=
∫ t
0
(
σ2(Xs)(∂xh)
2(Xs,Φ
∗
s−) + ω
2(Xs)Φ
∗
s−(∂ϕh)
2(Xs,Φ
∗
s−)
)
ds,
with Φ∗ as in (37), then we set
τn(h) := inf {t ≥ 0 : I(h)t ≥ n} ∧ n.(40)
Before stating the theorem we also notice that given a set U ⊂ I × (0,+∞),
its closure should be understood relatively to I×(0,+∞), in the sense that U
does not include the boundary of the state-space, i.e. U∩∂(I×(0,+∞)) = ∅.
Theorem 5.1 (Quasi-variational inequality). Let Assumption 2.1 hold.
Let u, u0, u1 : I × (0,+∞) → [0,∞) be continuous functions with u :=
u0 + ϕu1. Denote
C := {(x, ϕ) ∈ I × (0,+∞) : u(x, ϕ) > (1 + ϕ)f(x)} ,
Ci := {(x, ϕ) ∈ I × (0,+∞) : ui(x, ϕ) < g(x)} ,
and S := (I × (0,+∞)) \ C, Si := (I × (0,+∞)) \ Ci for i = 0, 1.
For i = 0, 1, assume that
u ∈W 2,∞loc (C
0 ∩ C1) ∩ C1(C0 ∩ C1) ∩C2(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1),
and
ui ∈ C2(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1),
and that (u, u0, u1) solve the quasi-variational inequality
max{L0u(x, ϕ), (1 + ϕ)f(x)− u(x, ϕ)} = 0, a.e. (x, ϕ) ∈ C0 ∩ C1 ,(41)
Liui(x, ϕ) = 0, for all (x, ϕ) ∈ C ∩ C0 ∩ C1 and for i = 0, 1,(42)
with the additional conditions
ui(x, ϕ) = f(x), for (x, ϕ) ∈ S,(43)
uiϕ(x, ϕ) = 0, for (x, ϕ) ∈ S
0 ∪ S1.(44)
Assume also that there exists Γ∗ ∈ Aθ, with Pi(Γ∗,0t < 1) = 1 and
P
i(Γ∗,1t < 1) = 1, for all t ≥ 0 and i = 0, 1, such that, recalling (37),
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we have: P0 and P1-a.s.,
∆Γ∗,0t ·∆Γ
∗,1
t = 0, for all t ≥ 0,(45)
(Xt,Φ
∗
t ) ∈ C
0 ∩ C1, for all t ≥ 0,(46) 
for i = 0, 1 and for all t ≥ 0,
dΓi,∗t = 1{(Xt,Φ∗t−)∈Si}dΓ
i,∗
t and∫ Φ∗
t
Φ∗
t−
1{(Xt,z)/∈Si}dz = 0.
(47)
Moreover, assume that τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : (Xt,Φ
∗
t ) /∈ C} is finite P-a.s., and
that the transversality conditions
lim
n→+∞
E
i
x,ϕ
[
1{τ∗>τn}u
i(Xτn ,Φ
∗
τn)
]
= 0, i = 0, 1,(48)
hold for τn = τn(u
i) and τn = τn(u) as in (40), and for all (x, ϕ) ∈ I ×
(0,+∞).
Then, letting γ∗θ ∈ A
θ be the randomised stopping time generated by Γ∗,
we have that (τ∗, γ∗θ ) forms a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, a value v
exists, and the equilibrium payoffs are given by
v = u(x, ϕ) = Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ ) and u
i(x, ϕ) = J ix,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ ), for i = 0, 1.(49)
Proof. We start by observing that under our assumptions the stopping times
τn(u
i), i = 0, 1, and τn(u) are such that τn(u
i), τn(u) → ∞ as n → ∞, P
0
and P1-a.s. (for this result we need Γ∗,it < 1 for all t ≥ 0).
Optimality of τ∗. Let τ ∈ T . Thanks to the assumed regularity of
u we can apply a version of Itoˆ’s formula for functions in W 2,∞loc (see, e.g.,
[20, Thm. 4.1, Ch. VIII]) to u(X,Φ∗), upon noticing that (X,Φ∗) only takes
values in C0 ∩ C1 as per (46). Letting {τn}
∞
n=1 be the localizing sequence of
stopping times τn = τn(u) and using that L
0u ≤ 0 almost everywhere on
C0 ∩ C1, we obtain
E
0
x,ϕ
[
(1− Γ∗,0τ∧τn)u(Xτ∧τn ,Φ
∗
τ∧τn)
]
(50)
≤u(x, ϕ) − E0x,ϕ
[∫ τ∧τn
0
u(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)dΓ
∗,0,c
t
]
+ E0x,ϕ
[∫ τ∧τn
0
uϕ(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
(
Φ∗t−dΓ
∗,0,c
t − ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t
)]
+ E0x,ϕ
[ ∑
t≤τ∧τn
(
(1− Γ∗,0t )u(Xt,Φ
∗
t )− (1− Γ
∗,0
t− )u(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
)]
,
where Γ∗,i,c denotes the continuous part of Γ∗,i, i = 0, 1.
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Since uϕ(x, ϕ) = u
0
ϕ(x, ϕ)+ϕu
1
ϕ(x, ϕ)+u
1(x, ϕ) and recalling (47) we see
that (44) implies
uϕ(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
(
Φ∗t−dΓ
∗,0,c
t − ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t
)
(51)
= u1(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)Φ
∗
t−dΓ
∗,0,c
t − g(Xt)ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t .
Then combining the integrals with respect to the continuous parts of the
increasing processes one finds
E
0
x,ϕ
[ ∫ τ∧τn
0
uϕ(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
(
Φ∗t−dΓ
∗,0,c
t − ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t
)
−
∫ τ∧τn
0
u(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)dΓ
∗,0,c
t
](52)
= −E0x,ϕ
[∫ τ∧τn
0
g(Xt)(dΓ
∗,0,c
t +ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t )
]
.
Next, we compute the contributions from jumps and recall (45). On the
event {∆Γ∗,0t > 0} we have, recalling (44) and (47),
u0(Xt,Φ
∗
t ) = u
0(Xt,Φ
∗
t−) = g(Xt)
u1(Xt,Φ
∗
t ) = u
1(Xt,Φ
∗
t−).
Consequently, using (37) and that ∆Γ∗,1t = 0, we get
(1− Γ∗,0t )u(Xt,Φ
∗
t )− (1− Γ
∗,0
t− )u(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)(53)
= (1− Γ∗,0t )
(
g(Xt) + Φ
∗
tu
1(Xt,Φ
∗
t )
)
− (1− Γ∗,0t− )
(
g(Xt) + Φ
∗
t−u
1(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
)
= −∆Γ∗,0t g(Xt).
Similarly, on the event {∆Γ∗,1t > 0} we have
(54) (1− Γ∗,0t )
(
u(Xt,Φ
∗
t )− u(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
)
= −∆Γ∗,1t Φtg(Xt).
By combining (50), (52), (53) and (54) we obtain
E
0
x,ϕ
[
(1− Γ∗,0τ∧τn)u(Xτ∧τn ,Φ
∗
τ∧τn)
]
(55)
≤u(x, ϕ) − E0x,ϕ
[∫ τ∧τn
0
g(Xt)(dΓ
∗,0
t +ΦtdΓ
∗,1
t )
]
,
where we notice that the integral with respect to the increasing processes
now includes the jump part as well. Rearranging terms and using that
u(x, ϕ) ≥ (1 + ϕ)f(x) for (x, ϕ) ∈ C0 ∩ C1 we get
u(x, ϕ) ≥E0x,ϕ
[
(1− Γ∗,0τ∧τn)f(Xτ∧τn)(1 + Φ
∗
τ∧τn)(56)
+
∫ τ∧τn
0
g(Xt)(dΓ
∗,0
t +ΦtdΓ
∗,1
t )
]
.
Passing to the limit as n→∞ and using Fatou’s lemma gives
u(x, ϕ) ≥ sup
τ∈T
Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γ
∗
θ ).
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To obtain the reverse inequality we repeat the steps above with τ∗ ∧ τn
in place of τ , where τn = τn(u) as in (40). In this case we can use standard
Itoˆ’s formula because u ∈ C2(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1) and (Xt∧τ∗ ,Φ
∗
t∧τ∗)t≥0 is bound
to evolve in C ∩ C0 ∩ C1. Then the inequality in (50) is an equality, so (55)
becomes
u(x, ϕ)= E0x,ϕ
[
(1−Γ∗,0τ∗∧τn)u(Xτ∗∧τn ,Φ
∗
τ∗∧n)+
∫ τ∗∧τn
0
g(Xt)(dΓ
∗,0
t +ΦtdΓ
∗,1
t )
]
= E0x,ϕ
[
(1− Γ∗,0τ∗ )f(Xτ∗)(1 + Φ
∗
τ∗)1{τ∗≤τn}
]
+ E0x,ϕ
[
(1− Γ∗,0τn )u(Xτn ,Φ
∗
τn)1{τn<τ∗}
]
+ E0x,ϕ
[∫ τ∗∧τn
0
g(Xt)(dΓ
∗,0
t +ΦtdΓ
∗,1
t )
]
,
where we have used that u(Xτ∗ ,Φ
∗
τ∗) = f(Xτ∗)(1 + Φ
∗
τ∗). From u(x, ϕ) =
u0(x, ϕ) + ϕu1(x, ϕ) and (48) we obtain
lim
n→+∞
E
0
x,ϕ
[
(1− Γ∗,0τn )u(Xτn ,Φ
∗
τn)1{τn<τ∗}
]
= 0,
so using monotone convergence we take limits as n→∞ to conclude that
u(x, ϕ) = sup
τ∈T
Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γ
∗
θ ) = Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ ).
Optimality of Γ∗. Pick Γ ∈ Aθ and note that (Xt∧τ∗ ,Φ
∗
t∧τ∗)t≥0 ∈
C ∩ C0 ∩ C1. Since ui ∈ C2(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1) for i = 0, 1, we can apply standard
Itoˆ’s formula to ui(X,Φ∗) and use that Liui = 0 on C ∩ C0 ∩ C1. This gives
E
i
x,ϕ
[
(1− Γiτ∗∧τn)u
i(Xτ∗∧τn ,Φ
∗
τ∗∧τn)
]
(57)
=ui(x, ϕ) − Eix,ϕ
[∫ τ∗∧τn
0
ui(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)dΓ
i,c
t
]
+ Eix,ϕ
[∫ τ∗∧τn
0
1− Γit−
1− Γ∗,0t−
uiϕ(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)(Φ
∗
t−dΓ
∗,0,c
t − ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t )
]
+ Eix,ϕ
[ ∑
t≤τ∗∧τn
(
(1− Γit)u
i(Xt,Φ
∗
t )− (1− Γ
i
t−)u
i(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
)]
,
where {τn}
∞
n=1 is the localizing sequence of stopping times τn = τn(u
i).
Recalling that uiϕ = 0 on the support of t 7→ dΓ
i,∗
t (cf. (47)) we immediately
see that
E
i
x,ϕ
[∫ τ∗∧τn
0
1− Γit−
1− Γ∗,0t−
uiϕ(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)(Φ
∗
t−dΓ
∗,0,c
t − ΦtdΓ
∗,1,c
t )
]
= 0.(58)
Moreover, (47) guarantees
ui(Xt,Φ
∗
t )− u
i(Xt,Φ
∗
t−) = 0, P
i
x,ϕ-a.s.
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so that by simply adding and subtracting (1− Γit−)u
i(Xt,Φ
∗
t ) in the sum of
jumps in (57) we obtain
E
i
x,ϕ
[ ∑
t≤τ∗∧τn
(
(1− Γit)u
i(Xt,Φ
∗
t )− (1− Γ
i
t−)u
i(Xt,Φ
∗
t−)
)]
(59)
= −Eix,ϕ
[ ∑
t≤τ∗∧τn
ui(Xt,Φ
∗
t )∆Γ
i
t
]
≥ −Eix,ϕ
[ ∑
t≤τ∗∧τn
g(Xt)∆Γ
i
t
]
,
where the final inequality uses that ui ≤ g on C ∩ C1−i.
Next, plugging (58) and (59) in (57), and using again that ui ≤ g on
C ∩ C1−i, we arrive at
E
i
x,ϕ
[
(1− Γiτ∗∧τn)u
i(Xτ∗∧τn ,Φ
∗
τ∗∧τn)
]
≥ ui(x, ϕ) − Eix,ϕ
[∫ τ∗∧τn
0
g(Xt)dΓ
i
t
]
,
(60)
where the integral now includes both the continuous part and the jump part
of the increasing process. Using (43) we see that
ui(x, ϕ) ≤Eix,ϕ
[
(1− Γiτ∗)f(Xτ∗)1{τ∗≤τn}
]
+ Eix,ϕ
[
(1− Γiτn)u
i(Xτn ,Φ
∗
τn)1{τn<τ∗}
]
+ Eix,ϕ
[∫ τ∗∧τn
0
g(Xt)dΓ
i
t
]
.
Passing to the limit as n → ∞, using the transversality condition (48) and
monotone convergence we obtain
ui(x, ϕ) ≤ Eix,ϕ
[
(1− Γiτ∗)f(Xτ∗) +
∫ τ∗
0
g(Xt)dΓ
i
t
]
.
Consequently,
ui(x, ϕ) ≤ inf
Γ∈Aθ
J ix,ϕ(τ
∗, γθ), for i = 0, 1.
The reverse inequality is obtained by taking Γ = Γ∗ in the proof above
and observing that in doing so the inequalities in (59) and (60) become
equalities. We thus obtain
ui(x, ϕ) = inf
Γ∈Aθ
J ix,ϕ(τ
∗, γθ) = J
i
x,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ ),
for i = 0, 1, which completes the proof. 
Remark 5.2. The assumption u ∈ C2(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1) is needed in the gener-
ality of the theorem because a priori the law of (X,Φ∗) may have atoms on
the boundary of the domain, i.e. on ∂(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1). However, in practical
examples where something is known about the geometry of C0 ∩ C1 one may
be able to rule out the existence of such atoms and the assumption may be
relaxed to u ∈ C1(C ∩ C0 ∩ C1) with bounded second derivatives.
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Remark 5.3. The assumption that Pi(Γ∗,0t < 1) = 1 and P
i(Γ∗,1t < 1) = 1
for all t ≥ 0 is useful for the localisation of the stochastic integrals in the
proof, and to avoid that the process Φ∗ reaches the endpoints of its state-
space (where u and ui are not properly defined). However, this is also a
natural assumption as we now explain: if for example, for some t ≥ 0 one
has Pi(Γ∗,0t = 1) > 0, then full information is revealed at time t, for all
ω ∈ {Γ∗,0t = 1}. This is an undesirable situation for Player 2 and one may
expect that such strategies should not be optimal.
We are not aware of any standard PDE results that guarantee the solv-
ability of the quasi-variational inequality above. Nevertheless, the structure
of (41)–(42) resembles that of quasi-variational inequalities for nonzero-sum
Dynkin games (see, e.g., [5] and more recently [11]), as we should expect
from Proposition 3.5 and Remark 3.6. Hence one may hope that general
existence of solutions can be found following ideas from that literature.
We will show in the next section that the assumptions in Theorem 5.1
hold in an example with a linear payoff structure.
6. An example with linear payoffs
In this section we study an example where the underlying diffusion is
a geometric Brownian motion and the payoff functions are linear. More
explicitly, let
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dWt,
where µ = µ0(1 − θ) + µ1θ and (with a small abuse of notation) µ0 and µ1
now are constants satisfying µ0 < µ1. In this case, the signal-to-noise ratio
ω = (µ1 − µ0)/σ is also a constant. Furthermore, let
f(x) = x and g(x) = (1 + ǫ)x,(61)
where ǫ > 0. Given a randomised stopping pair (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R , the
stopping game with asymmetric information has a payoff
R(τ, γθ) = Xτ1{τ<γθ} + (1 + ǫ)Xγθ1{τ≥γθ},
where we also recall that under P0 we have{
dXt = µ0Xtdt+ σXtdW
0
t ,
dΦt = ωΦtdW
0
t ,
and under P1 we have{
dXt = µ1Xtdt+ σXtdW
1
t ,
dΦt = ω
2Φtdt+ ωΦtdW
1
t .
Remark 6.1. Clearly, the case µ = µ0 is advantageous for Player 2, while
the case µ = µ1 would be preferred by Player 1. Furthermore, if µ0 < µ1 < 0,
then the inf-player (Player 2) would never stop, whereas if 0 < µ0 < µ1 the
sup-player (Player 1) would never stop.
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In light of the above remark, in the rest of this section we make the
following standing assumption.
Assumption 6.2. We have µ0 < 0 < µ1.
One key advantage of the linear structure of our example is that we can
effectively reduce the problem to one state variable, hence simplifying the
rest of the analysis. In particular we will see below that Φ is the only relevant
dynamic in the optimisation. For i = 0, 1 let P˜i be defined by
dP˜i
dPi
∣∣∣
FX
t
= exp
{
−
σ2
2
t+ σW it
}
,(62)
and notice that W˜ it := −σt + W
i
t is a P˜
i-Brownian motion. For future
reference we note that
dXt = (µi + σ
2)Xtdt+ σXtdW˜
i
t , under P˜
i(63)
and
dΦt = σωΦtdt+ ωΦtdW˜
0
t , under P˜
0,(64)
dΦt = (σω + ω
2)Φtdt+ ωΦtdW˜
1
t , under P˜
1.(65)
It is also easy to verify that Φ and X are effectively linked by direct propor-
tionality, that is
ϕ−1Φt = x
−ω/σ
(
Xt
)ω/σ
e
(
(i−1/2)ω2−ω
σ
(µi−
σ2
2 )
)
t , P˜i-a.s.(66)
Lemma 6.3. For (x, ϕ) ∈ R+ × R+ and (τ, γθ) ∈ T × T
θ
R our game payoff
can be rewritten as
Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γθ) = x
(
E˜
0
ϕ
[
eµ0τ (1− Γ0τ ) + (1 + ǫ)
∫ τ
0
eµ0tdΓ0t
]
(67)
+ E˜0ϕ
[
eµ0τΦτ (1− Γ
1
τ ) + (1 + ǫ)
∫ τ
0
eµ0tΦtdΓ
1
t
])
.
Moreover, we have Ĵx,ϕ(τ, γθ) = J
0
x,ϕ(τ,Γ
0) + ϕJ 1x,ϕ(τ,Γ
1), where
J 0x,ϕ(τ,Γ
0) = x E˜0ϕ
[
eµ0τ (1− Γ0τ ) + (1 + ǫ)
∫ τ
0
eµ0tdΓ0t
]
(68)
and
J 1x,ϕ(τ,Γ
1) = x E˜1ϕ
[
eµ1τ (1− Γ1τ ) + (1 + ǫ)
∫ τ
0
eµ1tdΓ1t
]
.(69)
Proof. The expression in (67) follows from (22) and (26), upon noticing that
Xt = x e
µ0t dP˜
0
dP0
∣∣∣
FX
t
, P0-a.s.,
and arguing as in the proof of Corollary 3.2. Likewise, (68) and (69) follow
from (24) and (25). 
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It is intuitively clear that Player 2 should never stop in the case µ = µ0.
Note that, for any Γ0 ∈ A, integration by parts allows us to rewrite (68) as
J 0x,ϕ(τ,Γ
0) =x
(
1 + E˜0ϕ
[
µ0
∫ τ
0
eµ0t(1− Γ0t )dt+ ǫ
∫ τ
0
eµ0tdΓ0t
])
.
Using that µ0 < 0, we immediately obtain
J 0x,ϕ(τ,Γ
0) ≥ x
(
1 + E˜0ϕ
[
µ0
∫ τ
0
eµ0tdt
])
= J 0x,ϕ(τ, 0),
i.e. (31) holds. Consequently, Proposition 3.7 shows that it is sufficient to
look for a Nash equilibrium in the subclass of γ ∈ T θR for which γ0 = +∞
(equivalently, Γ0 = 0).
Now we need to work out the remaining equilibrium control Γ∗,1 and the
stopping time τ∗. We first formulate an educated guess on the structure
of τ∗ and Γ∗,1, and subsequently we verify that using such a guess we can
produce a solution of the quasi-variational inequality from Theorem 5.1.
6.1. Candidate adjusted likelihood ratio. In the case µ = µ1, the exis-
tence of asymmetric information creates an incentive for the informed player
not to stop immediately in order to ‘fool’ the uninformed player. Indeed, if
the uninformed player is made to believe that the drift is low (i.e., µ = µ0),
then the uninformed player may choose to stop early, which is beneficial for
the informed player since then only the smaller payoff has to be paid. Thus
it is natural that Player 2 will only want to stop when Φ becomes too high
(i.e., the uninformed player has a strong belief that the drift is µ1).
Including the idea of randomisation in the reasoning above, we expect
that the informed player will stop at some upper threshold according to
some ‘intensity’. The effect of randomisation is to generate an adjusted
likelihood ratio Φ∗, which can be interpreted as the belief of the uninformed
player after manipulation performed by the informed one. For Player 2 it is
therefore a question of finding the optimal trade-off between manipulating
Player 1’s beliefs and stopping not too late.
Following the heuristics above we conjecture that Player 2 will construct
Γ∗,1 in a way that reflects the process Φ∗ = Φ(1−Γ∗,1) at an upper threshold.
With this idea in mind, let B ∈ (0,∞) and an initial belief ϕ ∈ (0,∞) be
given. It is well known that there exists a unique pair of processes (Y,L)
such that P˜0ϕ-a.s. one has
(L)t≥0 is continuous and non-decreasing with L0 = 0,(70)
Y0− = ϕ, Y0 = ϕ ∧B and Yt ∈ (0, B] for t ≥ 0,(71)
(Y,L) solves
{
dYt = σωYt dt+ ωYt dW˜
0
t − dLt ,∫ t
0 1{Ys<B}dLs = 0.
(72)
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Then Y is a diffusion process with reflection at B. Define the process ΓB ∈ A
by ΓB0− = 0, Γ
B
0 = max{0, 1 −B/ϕ} and
ΓBt = 1− (1− Γ
B
0 )e
−Lt/B , P˜0ϕ-a.s.(73)
Next we show that the adjusted likelihood ratio corresponding to the pair
Γ = (0,ΓB) is given by the reflected process Y .
Proposition 6.4. Fix B ∈ (0,∞), and consider the processes (Y,L) and
ΓB as above. Then for any ϕ ∈ (0,∞) we have
ΦBt := Φt(1− Γ
B
t ) = Yt, for all t ≥ 0, P˜
0
ϕ-a.s.(74)
Proof. Noticing that (72) implies dLt = 1{Yt=B}dLt we can write the first
equation in (72) as
dYt = σωYt dt+ ωYt dW˜
0
t −B
−1YtdLt.
Recalling now (70)–(71) and thanks to the above equation we can write Y
explicitly under P˜0ϕ as
Yt =(ϕ ∧B) exp
(
ωW˜ 0t + (σω −
ω2
2 )t−B
−1Lt
)
.
A direct comparison of the expression above with ΓB in (73) and Φ in (64)
gives (74). 
Below we formulate and solve a variational problem based on the con-
jecture mentioned at the beginning of the section: Player 2 will select a
threshold B ∈ R+ and adopt the randomised stopping time generated by the
couple (0,ΓB) ∈ A×A. Player 1 will instead choose a threshold A ∈ (0, B)
and stop at
τA := inf{t ≥ 0 : Φ
B
t ≤ A}.(75)
6.2. Quasi-variational inequality for the problem with linear pay-
off. Here we use a constructive approach to obtain the candidate quasi-
variational inequality for the game, which we will then test against the
requirements of Theorem 5.1 in the next section.
As mentioned above, we look for an equilibrium with Γ∗,0 ≡ 0. If Player 2
plays Γ = (0,ΓB) and Player 1 plays τA, we obtain from (68)
J 0x,ϕ(τA,Γ
∗,0) = xE˜0ϕ [e
µ0τA ] =: xV0(ϕ).(76)
The idea is that we should verify that u0(x, ϕ) = xV0(ϕ) with u
0 as in
Theorem 5.1. This will be done in Theorem 6.10, using facts collected in
this section.
It is easy to check (see, e.g., [36]) that V0 satisfies
(77)

ω2ϕ2
2 V
′′
0 (ϕ) + σωϕV
′
0(ϕ) + µ0V0(ϕ) = 0, ϕ ∈ (A,B)
V0(ϕ) = 1, ϕ ∈ (0, A]
V ′0(B−) = 0.
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Notice that the condition at B is the usual normal reflection condition.
Moreover, observing that P˜0ϕ(Φ
B
0 = B) = 1 for ϕ ≥ B, it follows that
E˜
0
ϕ [e
µ0τA ] = E˜0B [e
µ0τA ] for ϕ ≥ B, and therefore
V ′0(ϕ) = 0, ϕ ≥ B.(78)
Moreover, we also note that µ0 < 0 implies that
V0(ϕ) ≤ 1, ϕ ≥ A.(79)
Conversely, an application of Itoˆ’s formula gives
Lemma 6.5. Assume there exists V¯0 ∈ C
1([A,+∞)) with V¯0 ∈ C
2([A,B])
that solves (77)–(78). Then V¯0(ϕ) = E˜
0
ϕ
[
eµ0τA
]
= V 0(ϕ).
Next we introduce a function xV1(ϕ) which we want to associate with
J 1x,ϕ(τA,Γ
B) from (69). We cast a boundary-value problem for V1 according
to the following logic:
(i) In the interval (A,B) neither of the two players should stop, so the
function V1 should be harmonic for the process Φ
B with creation at
rate µ1;
(ii) The informed player will only stop when the process ΦB exceeds B
(although not necessarily at the first hitting time of B). Then we
expect V1(B) = 1 + ǫ;
(iii) For the choice of B to be optimal for Player 2 (given that Player 1
uses τA), the classical smooth-fit condition should hold, that is we
expect V ′1(B−) = 0;
(iv) If the uninformed player stops first (according to τA) then the cost
for Player 2 is V1(A) = 1.
Combining the four items above gives us the boundary value problem
(80)

ω2ϕ2
2 V
′′
1 (ϕ) + (ω
2 + σω)ϕV ′1(ϕ) + µ1V1(ϕ) = 0, ϕ ∈ (A,B)
V1(ϕ) = 1, ϕ ∈ (0, A]
V1(ϕ) = 1 + ǫ, ϕ ∈ [B,∞)
V ′1(B) = 0.
Notice that if V1 ∈ C
1([A,+∞)) ∩ C2([A,B]) solves the above system,
then it is easy to verify
xV1(ϕ) = J
1
x,ϕ(τA,Γ
B)(81)
thanks to an application of Itoˆ calculus. Further we can establish mono-
tonicity of V1, which will be useful later in this section.
Lemma 6.6. Assume that 0 < A < B and V1 ∈ C
2([A,B]) solves (80).
Then V ′1(ϕ) ≥ 0 for ϕ ∈ [A,B] and 1 ≤ V1(ϕ) < 1 + ǫ for ϕ ∈ [A,B).
Proof. Let us start by observing that the first, third and fourth equations
in (80) imply
ω2B2
2 V
′′
1 (B−) = −µ1(1 + ǫ) < 0.
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The above and V ′1(B) = 0 imply that there exists λ0 > 0 (with B−λ0 ≥ A)
such that
V ′1(ϕ) > 0 , for ϕ ∈ (B − λ0, B).(82)
With the aim of reaching a contradiction, assume that there exists ϕ ∈
(A,B) such that V ′1(ϕ) < 0. Then we can also define
c := sup{ϕ ∈ (A,B) : V ′1(ϕ) < 0},
and clearly c ∈ (A,B − λ0]. Due to continuity of V
′
1 it must be V
′
1(c) = 0.
Since the ODE is of Euler type, its solution is a linear combination of power
functions; thus V1 ∈ C
∞(A,B). Then, setting v1 := V
′
1 and differentiating
the first equation in (80) we get that v1 must solve the boundary value
problem
(83)
{
ω2ϕ2
2 v
′′
1 (ϕ) + (2ω
2 + σω)ϕv′1(ϕ) + αv1(ϕ) = 0, ϕ ∈ (c,B),
v1(c+) = v1(B−) = 0,
with α := ω2 + σω + µ1. It then follows, e.g. by the Feynman-Kac formula,
that v1(ϕ) = 0 for ϕ ∈ (c,B), which contradicts (82).
Then V ′1(ϕ) ≥ 0 in [A,B] as claimed. Moreover, 1 ≤ V1(ϕ) < 1 + ǫ for
ϕ ∈ [A,B), by the second and third equation in (80). 
Hereafter, when referring to V1 we will implicitly assume that it solves
(80) (we show in the next subsection that (80) and (84) below can be solved
simultaneously in a unique way).
Recalling (67) it is now natural to associate Ĵx,ϕ(τA, 0,Γ
1,B) to the func-
tion
xV (ϕ) := x(V0(ϕ) + ϕV1(ϕ)).
Using the second equations in (77) and (80), we see immediately that V (A) =
1+A. Moreover, recalling also (26), the function Ξ(x, ϕ) := xV (ϕ)/(1 + ϕ)
should represent the equilibrium payoff for the uninformed player (notice
that indeed Ξ(x,A) = x). Thus, by optimality, we expect that the classical
smooth-fit condition holds at the boundary A, i.e. Ξϕ(x,A+) = 0 or, equiv-
alently, V ′(A+) = 1. Hence, using (77) and (80) we obtain that V should
solve the boundary value problem
(84)

ω2ϕ2
2 V
′′(ϕ) + σωϕV ′(ϕ) + µ0V (ϕ) = 0, ϕ ∈ (A,B)
V (ϕ) = 1 + ϕ, ϕ ∈ (0, A]
V ′(A+) = 1,
V ′(B−) = 1 + ǫ.
Moreover,
V ′(ϕ) = 1 + ǫ, ϕ ≥ B(85)
by (78) and (80). Before closing this section we provide some useful prop-
erties of V .
Lemma 6.7. Assume that V ∈ C2([A,B]) solves (84). Then V (ϕ) > 1 +ϕ
and V ′(ϕ) > 1 for ϕ ∈ (A,B).
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Proof. First note that the ODE is of Euler type, so V ∈ C∞(A,B). Differ-
entiating the first equation in (84) and imposing the boundary conditions
for V ′ at A and B, we find that v := V ′ solves
(86)

ω2ϕ2
2 v
′′(ϕ) + (ω2 + σω)ϕv′(ϕ) + µ1v(ϕ) = 0, ϕ ∈ (A,B)
v(A+) = 1,
v(B−) = 1 + ǫ.
Recalling the dynamics of Φ under P˜1 (see (65)), setting
ρA := inf{t ≥ 0 : Φt ≤ A} and ρB := inf{t ≥ 0 : Φt ≥ B},
and using Itoˆ’s formula, we easily obtain
v(ϕ) =E˜1ϕ
[
eµ1(ρA∧ρB)v(ΦρA∧ρB )
]
(87)
=E˜1ϕ
[
eµ1(ρA∧ρB)
]
+ ǫ E˜1ϕ
[
eµ1ρB1{ρB<ρA}
]
.
Now both claims in the lemma follow from (87), due to µ1 > 0 and
recalling that V (ϕ) = 1 + ϕ for ϕ ≤ A. 
Finally, we notice that Lemma 6.7 and the fact that V ′(A+) = 1 imply
that V ′′(A+) ≥ 0. Then plugging the second and third equation of (84) into
the first one and using V ′′(A+) ≥ 0 we obtain
ω2A2
2
V ′′(A+) + σωA+ µ0(1 +A) = 0 =⇒ µ1A+ µ0 ≤ 0.
Corollary 6.8. Assume that V ∈ C2([A,B]) solves (84). Then it must be
A ≤ −µ0/µ1.
6.3. Solution of the variational problem and Nash equilibrium. We
now show that (80) and (84) can be solved simultaneously in a unique way.
Note that once the functions V and V1 and the boundary points A and B
are found, the function V0 is automatically determined from the relation
V0(ϕ) := V (ϕ)− ϕV1(ϕ).
The general solution of the ODE for V1 in (80) is
(88) V1(ϕ) = C1ϕ
β1−1 + C2 ϕ
β2−1,
where C1 and C2 are constants and β1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 < 0 are solutions of
the quadratic equation
1
2
ω2β(β − 1) + σωβ + µ0 = 0.
The third and fourth boundary conditions in (80) can be used to determine
C1 and C2 as
C1 =
(1− β2)(1 + ǫ)
β1 − β2
B1−β1 and C2 =
(β1 − 1)(1 + ǫ)
β1 − β2
B1−β2 .
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From the condition V1(A) = 1 and the derived expressions for C1 and C2,
we arrive at the equation
(89) (1− β2)
(
A
B
)β1−1
+ (β1 − 1)
(
A
B
)β2−1
=
β1 − β2
1 + ǫ
.
Lemma 6.9. There exists a unique value of A/B ∈ (0, 1) satisfying (89).
Proof. Letting h(z) = (1 − β2)z
β1−1 + (β1 − 1)z
β2−1 − (β1 − β2)/(1 + ǫ)
we can see that h′(z) = (1 − β2)(β1 − 1)
[
zβ1−2 − zβ2−2
]
> 0 for z ∈ (0, 1)
since β1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 < 0. Furthermore, limz↓0 h(z) = −∞ and h(1) =
ǫ(β1 − β2)/(1 + ǫ) > 0. Hence we conclude that there is a unique root of
h(z) = 0 in (0, 1). 
Next, the general solution of the ODE for V in (84) is
(90) V (ϕ) = D1ϕ
β1 +D2ϕ
β2
for constants D1 and D2. The second and third boundary conditions in (84)
can be used to determine D1 and D2 as
D1 =
A−β1
β1 − β2
[−β2 + (1− β2)A] and D2 =
A−β2
β1 − β2
[β1 + (β1 − 1)A] .
From the boundary condition V ′(B−) = 1 + ǫ and the derived expressions
for D1 and D2, we arrive at the equation
(1 + ǫ)(β1 − β2)B = (A/B)
−β2 β2 [β1 + (β1 − 1)A]
− (A/B)−β1 β1 [β2 + (β2 − 1)A] .
Denoting the unique root of (89) as δ = A/B ∈ (0, 1) we set A = δB to
obtain
(1 + ǫ)(β1 − β2)B = δ
−β2β2 [β1 + (β1 − 1)δB](91)
− δ−β1β1 [β2 + (β2 − 1)δB] .
The linear equation (91) has the unique solution
(92) B =
β1β2(δ
−β2 − δ−β1)
(1 + ǫ)(β1 − β2)− β2(β1 − 1)δ1−β2 + β1(β2 − 1)δ1−β1
,
and it is straightforward to check that B > 0, using that δ ∈ (0, 1) in both
the numerator and denominator.
From the above we see that A and B are uniquely determined by (89)
and (92), and the corresponding candidate values V1 and V are given by
(88) and (90), respectively. Notice that in order to define V on (0,+∞) we
simply extend V constructed above, in a C1 way, by taking
V (ϕ) = V (B) + (1 + ǫ)(ϕ −B), for ϕ ≥ B,(93)
V (ϕ) = 1 + ϕ, for ϕ ≤ A.(94)
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Moreover, we extend V1 to [B,+∞) in a C
1 way and to (0, A] in a continuous
way by taking
V1(ϕ) = 1 + ǫ, for ϕ ≥ B,(95)
V1(ϕ) = 1, for ϕ ≤ A.(96)
Theorem 6.10. Let A < B be the unique solution of (89) and (92), and
let V1 and V be constructed as in (88) and (90) with (93)–(96). Denote
V0(ϕ) := V (ϕ) − ϕV1(ϕ) and recall Φ
B and τA from (74) and (75). Let
Γ∗ = (0,ΓB), let γ∗θ be the randomised stopping time generated by Γ
∗, and set
τ∗ := τA. Then the randomised stopping pair (τ
∗, γ∗θ ) is a Nash equilibrium
for the game with linear payoffs as in (61). Moreover, for all (x, ϕ) ∈
R+ ×R+ we have
Ĵx,ϕ(τ
∗, γ∗θ ) = xV (ϕ),
J 0x,ϕ(τ
∗, 0) = xV0(ϕ),
J 1x,ϕ(τ
∗,ΓB) = xV1(ϕ).
Proof. The proof relies on showing that u(x, ϕ) := xV (ϕ) and ui(x, ϕ) :=
xVi(ϕ), i = 0, 1, fulfill all conditions in Theorem 5.1.
Let us start by setting, for i = 0, 1,
C := {(x, ϕ) : u(x, ϕ) > (1+ϕ)x} and Ci := {(x, ϕ) : ui(x, ϕ) < (1+ǫ)x}
and S := R2+ \ C, S
i := R2+ \ C
i. From Lemma 6.6 and the second equation
in (80) we obtain C1 = R+× (0, B) and S
1 = R+× [B,+∞). Similarly, from
(85) and Lemma 6.7 we get C = R+ × (A,+∞) and S = R+ × (0, A].
Since V and V1 solve (84)–(85) and (80), respectively, it is immediate to
check that V0 solves (77)–(78). Moreover, Lemma 6.5 guarantees that V0
also satisfies (76). Then (79) holds as well, implying C0 = R2+ and S
0 = ∅.
Now that C, Ci, S, Si are specified, it is easy to check that on S we have
L0u(x, ϕ) = L0[x(1 + ϕ)] = x(µ0 + µ1ϕ) ≤ 0,(97)
where the last inequality follows from Corollary 6.8 (recall that Li is the
infinitesimal generator of (X,Φ) under the measure Pi). Therefore, (97)
and (84) imply (41). Moreover, (77) and (80) imply (42). Furthermore,
the second equations in (77) and in (80) imply (43), and (78) and the third
equation of (80) imply (44).
It is clear that (Xt,Φ
B
t )t≥0 meets conditions (45)–(47) by construction
since all probability measures we consider are equivalent on Ft, for each
t < ∞. Moreover, Pi(τA < ∞) = 1 since τA is the first hitting time of
a constant level for a reflected diffusion, so it follows that P(τA < ∞) =
(1− π)P0(τA <∞) + πP
1(τA <∞) = 1.
It only remains to check the transversality condition (48). First we notice
that τn(u) and τn(u
i), i = 0, 1, defined as in (40) converge to infinity as
n → ∞ under Pi and P˜i, i = 0, 1, thanks to the regularity of u and ui.
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Using that ΦBt ∈ [0, B] for all t ≥ 0, P
0
x,ϕ-a.s. and that V0 is bounded by
one, we obtain
0 ≤ lim
n→+∞
E
0
x,ϕ
[
XτnV0(Φ
B
τn)1{τA>τn}
]
≤ lim
n→+∞
E
0
x,ϕ
[
Xτn1{τA>τn}
]
= 0
since the P0-geometric Brownian {Xt, t ≥ 0} is uniformly integrable. Thus
(48) holds for i = 0.
To prove (48) for i = 1 we see that it follows from (80) and an application
of Ito’s formula that Zt := e
µ1(t∧τA)V1(Φ
B
t∧τA) is a P˜
1
ϕ-martingale. By Fatou’s
lemma,
E˜
1
ϕ
[
eµ1τA
]
≤ lim
t→∞
E˜
1
ϕ
[
eµ1(t∧τA)V1(Φ
B
t∧τA)
]
≤ V1(ϕ) <∞,
which also implies P˜1(τA < +∞) = 1, as needed below.
Finally, we have
0 ≤ lim
n→+∞
E
1
x,ϕ
[
XτnV1(Φ
B
τn)1{τA>τn}
]
≤ (1 + ǫ) lim
n→+∞
lim
t→+∞
E
1
x,ϕ
[
Xτn1{τA∧t>τn}
]
=x(1 + ǫ) lim
n→+∞
lim
t→+∞
E˜
1
ϕ
[
eµ1τn1{τA∧t>τn}
]
≤x(1 + ǫ) lim
n→+∞
E˜
1
ϕ
[
eµ1τn1{τA>τn}
]
= 0,
where we used that ΦBt ∈ [0, B] for all t ≥ 0, P˜
1
ϕ-a.s. and that V1 is bounded
by 1+ǫ on (0, B], and the last equality is due to dominated convergence. 
7. Numerical Results
To illustrate the Nash equilibrium found in Section 6 we consider a base-
case set of parameters with µ0 = −1, µ1 = 1, σ = 0.5 and ǫ = 0.1. For
these parameters, the boundaries defined by (89) and (92) are found to
be A = 0.329 and B = 0.868. For ease of interpretation, however, in the
following we will return to the posterior probability process Π∗, where we
denote the lower boundary as a := A/(1 + A) and the upper (reflecting)
boundary as b := B/(1+B). For our base case this corresponds to a = 0.248
and b = 0.465. Furthermore, we let x = 1 and note that u(1, ϕ) = V (ϕ) and
ui(1, ϕ) = Vi(ϕ); accordingly, we refer to V and Vi as value functions.
Firstly, Figure 1 demonstrates a typical sample path of the Π∗-process and
its associated Γ∗,1-process. Note that in this particular example, Player 1
stops at τ∗ ≈ 0.06, and that Γ∗,1τ∗ ≈ 0.13. Consequently, Player 1 stops
before Player 2 if either µ = µ0 or if µ = µ1 and the uniformly distributed
randomisation device U takes a value larger than 0.13.
Next, Figure 2 shows the value functions for Player 1 and Player 2 corre-
sponding to our base case. Note that V and V1 satisfy smooth fit conditions
at a and b respectively, and V0 satisfies the reflection condition at b. We also
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Figure 1. A typical sample path of the Π∗-process (left)
and its associated Γ∗,1-process (right) for our base-case pa-
rameters. Note that the dashed lines on the left represent
the optimal boundaries a = 0.248 and b = 0.465 and that we
have chosen π = 0.35.
observe the properties of V0 described in (78) and (79), along with the prop-
erties of V1 and V described in Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. When the
true drift is µ1, the informed player expects to pay out considerably more
than Player 1 has reason to believe, and when the true drift is µ0, the in-
formed player expects to pay out less. When µ = µ1, the gap between 1 + ǫ
and the value of the game to Player 2 can be seen to represent the reduction
in Player 2’s expected cost due to Player 1 being uninformed. Similarly,
when µ = µ0, the gap between 1 and the value of the game to Player 2
represents the reduction in Player 2’s expected cost due to Player 1 being
uninformed.
Figure 3 shows comparative static results for the changing of all four pa-
rameters (µ0, µ1, σ, ǫ) with the base case used above. We first note that the
signal-to-noise ratio, ω = (µ1 − µ0)/σ, plays a crucial role in understanding
these results since a higher ω will result in faster learning by the uninformed
player. In this sense, changes in the parameters µ0, µ1 and σ will affect
the signal-to-noise ratio and hence the speed of learning, which will ulti-
mately have an impact on the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, changing
µ0, µ1 and σ will not only have an effect on the speed of learning (through
the signal-to-noise ratio) but also on the expected payoff of the game, po-
tentially resulting in non-monotone dependencies due to these competing
effects. Finally, we note that ǫ only influences the problem through the pay-
off structure of the game and has no impact on the rate at which Player 1
is able to learn about the drift. With this understanding in mind, we now
proceed to describe the comparative statics results observed in Figure 3.
We first consider the effect of changing µ1 on the equilibrium outcome. As
µ1 increases (all else being equal), the good scenario for Player 1 gets better,
both due to a larger drift, and also due to an increased signal-to-noise ratio
which speeds up the learning process. This indicates that the threshold a
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Figure 2. The value of the game to Player 1 (solid line;
(1−π)V0+πV1) along with the value of the game to Player 2
when µ = µ0 (dotted line; V0) and µ = µ1 (dashed line; V1).
The base-case parameters are µ0 = −1, µ1 = 1, σ = 0.5 and
ǫ = 0.1; therefore a = 0.248 and b = 0.465 (represented by
the two vertical lines).
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Figure 3. The optimal boundaries (a = solid line and b =
dashed line) for the base-case parameters (µ0 = −1, µ1 = 1,
σ = 0.5 and ǫ = 0.1) as we vary µ0, µ1, σ and ǫ, respectively.
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should be decreasing in the drift µ1, which is also confirmed numerically, see
Figure 3(b). Likewise, if µ = µ1 and µ1 is large, then continuing is costly
for Player 2, and at the same time, the advantage of having additional
information about the drift is smaller (because of the increased signal-to-
noise ratio). Consequently, the threshold b should be decreasing in µ1, which
is also confirmed numerically.
When considering a change in µ0, there are two competing effects on
both players. On one hand, a decreasing µ0 is bad for Player 1 (the sup-
player), and hence has an increasing effect on the threshold a. On the
other hand, a decreasing µ0 increases the signal-to-noise ratio, which speeds
up the learning process, and hence decreases a. Figure 3(a) confirms the
suspicion that there is no monotone dependence of a on µ0. For the same
reasons as above, the effect of a change in µ0 on the upper threshold b is
ambiguous. However, this potential ambiguity is not visible in Figure 3(a)
for our base-case parameters.
From Figure 3(c) we see that as σ increases the optimal threshold is
increasing for Player 1 and decreasing for Player 2. The intuition behind
this is that, as σ increases, the signal-to-noise ratio decreases, resulting in
slower learning and hence a smaller value function for Player 1 and hence an
increased a. For Player 2, however, while an increased σ means that they are
better able to hide their information from Player 1 (an incentive to increase
b), the reduced variance of the Π-process also means that first hitting time
of a given threshold is larger for an increased σ. Since µ1 > 0, a longer
expected time to stop would ultimately result in an increased expected cost
for Player 2 (an incentive to decrease b). By the numerics, the net result
for our base-case parameters is that Player 2 reduces their threshold b as σ
increases.
Lastly, we consider the effect of a change in ǫ. Since the value of ǫ does
not impact the ability of Player 1 to learn about the drift, its effect on the
equilibrium can only be through the payoff structure of the game. Therefore,
all value functions clearly increase in ǫ; for Player 1 this means that the
continuation region is increasing in ǫ, so that the threshold a is decreasing.
However, no easy monotonicity for b can be deduced as there is no obvious
effect on the continuation region for Player 2 (since also the obstacle depends
on ǫ). From Figure 3(d) we observe the anticipated monotonic dependence
of a on ǫ and, for our base-case parameters at least, b is also seen to be
monotonic decreasing in ǫ.
Finally, to calculate the value of information for the game, we end the ar-
ticle with an informal discussion on the case with symmetric and incomplete
information. Assume that both players have the same initial prior distribu-
tion for µ, that is they agree on π as the initial probability that the drift is
µ1, and 1 − π as the probability that the drift is µ0. Then randomisation
is not needed for either player and a Nash equilibrium in stopping times
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(τ1, τ2) can be obtained. In fact, the game with linear payoffs reduces to
U(x, ϕ) =
x
1 + ϕ
sup
τ1
inf
τ2
E˜
0
ϕ
[
eµ0τ1(1 + Φτ1)1{τ1<τ2}
+(1 + ǫ)eµ0τ2(1 + Φτ2)1{τ2≤τ1}
]
where
dΦt = σωΦt dt+ ωΦt dW˜
0
t
under P˜0. It is then straightforward to check that one can find A,B ∈ (0,∞)
with A < B and a function V̂ with 1 + ϕ ≤ V̂ ≤ (1 + ǫ)(1 + ϕ) such that
ω2ϕ2
2 V̂
′′(ϕ) + σωϕV̂ ′(ϕ) + µ0V̂ (ϕ) = 0, for ϕ ∈ (A,B)
V̂ (ϕ) = 1 +A, for ϕ ∈ (0, A]
V̂ ′(A+) = 1,
V̂ (ϕ) = (1 + ǫ)(1 +B), for ϕ ∈ [B,∞)
V̂ ′(B−) = 1 + ǫ.
Using standard verification arguments, (τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) := (τA, τB) is a Nash equi-
librium of stopping times, and the corresponding value function is given by
U(x, ϕ) = xV̂ (ϕ)/(1 + ϕ).
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Figure 4. On the left: The common value function for both
players in the symmetric incomplete information case (solid
line) in comparison to the value function in the asymmetric
case (dashed line). The two vertical lines correspond to the
values a := A/(1+A) and b := B/(1+B) (for the symmetric
case). On the right: The difference between these values,
which represents the value of information in our game. Base-
case parameters: µ0 = −1, µ1 = 1, σ = 0.5 and ǫ = 0.1,
which yields a = 0.193 and b = 0.758 (for the symmetric
case).
Figure 4 plots the value function U(1, π) = U(x, π)/x for our base-case
parameters, along with the value function of the uninformed player for the
asymmetric case for comparison. The difference between the asymmetric
value function and the symmetric one is also plotted and can be interpreted
as the value of information in this setting.
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